We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether the double auction institution can suppress market power in emissions trading markets. We study twenty-four markets with varying market structure in a ABA crossover design which controls for subject effects. We find clear evidence of successful use of market power. Average prices rise under monopoly and fall under monopsony. Opening prices are affected much more than closing prices. Profits are redistributed in favour of the agent with power. Efficiency is not affected significantly. Analysis of convergence trends suggests this is not a transitory phenomenon. We interpret our results as evidence of successful price discrimination within a double auction market.
Introduction
Emissions trading is frequently advocated as an instrument for market-based environmental regulation. Unfortunately many potential emissions trading markets are likely to be sufficiently concentrated to create market power. At the international level, it is frequently thought that the United States will be a dominant buyer and the states of the former Soviet Union dominant suppliers in Annex I trading under the Kyoto protocol. Nordhaus and Boyer (1999, 121) estimate that the United States will account for approximately 44 percent of carbon emissions permit purchases by 2010 while the former Soviet Union will account for nearly 56 percent of sales. By 2050 the share for the United States will fall to 39 percent while the share for the former Soviet Union will rise to 68 percent (in both 2010 and 2050 eastern Europe will account for the balance of sales). These estimates are based on competitive market pricing. Bernstein et al. (1999, 250) estimate that full exploitation of monopoly power by Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union could induce a monopoly mark-up of 180 percent and raise international carbon permit prices from US$90/tonne to $129 per tonne.
These concentration concerns are particularly relevant if trading under the Kyoto Protocol is implemented on a country-to-country basis. If countries delegate trading authority to polluting firms, concentration in world greenhouse gas markets could be significantly lessened. High market concentration may still be a problem in trading permits for other pollutants, however, particularly in markets for regionally restricted air and water pollutants. For example, the Ontario Ministry of Environment (2000) has announced a mandatory cap on nitrogen oxide (NO x ) and sulphur oxide (SO x ) emissions from six 2 2 A double auction is organized like most stock markets. Any agent may submit a bid to buy, an offer to sell, or an acceptance of an outstanding bid or offer. Outstanding bids, offers, and transactions prices are common knowledge.
fossil fuel generating stations in the beginning of 2001. The generating stations are all owned by Ontario Power Generation (OPG), but these may be sold in the future. Current production of NO x is about 50 kilotonnes (kt) per year, well in excess of the cap of 36 kt. The shortfall can be made up by purchases of emission reduction credits from sources in the non-capped sector. The market for these credits is geographically restricted by a requirement that they be generated by sources in or (to a limited extent) upwind from Ontario. Specific measures are proposed for discounting credits generated more than 300 km upwind of the region. OPG has undertaken an extensive program of amassing and banking these credits.
There are no other purchasers. Off-the-record comments from industry observers suggest that OPG is paying distinctly less for these credits than might be expected in the United States. This is consistent with the exercise of monopsony power.
The effective exercise of market power in emissions trading markets might raise concern on two distinct grounds. First, of course, market power may restrict the net sales of permits and lead to an inefficient allocation of responsibilities for abatement. Secondly, market power may reallocate the allocation of gains from trade in a direction that may or may not be viewed favourably, depending on one's political perspective. Note that it is possible to have the second effect without the first if the traders with market power are able to practice price discrimination. Porter (1991) has conjectured this is a possibility in double-auction markets.
Some observers have suggested that potential market power in emissions trading may be controlled by using double auctions (Bohm 1998, 55) . 2 This suggestion is based on laboratory evidence. Smith (1981) found that monopolists trading in a double auction market experienced difficulty in maintaining monopoly prices. Monopolists in his double oral auctions were able to obtain only about 25 percent of the 3 3 The potential price increase is derived from predictions for a monopolist who posts a single price throughout a period. The double-auction data are based on the last period in each of three sessions of differing length. Prices were declining during the last few periods of each session, suggesting that they might ultimately have converged to an even lower value. This decline was not evident in the posted offer session. 4 In a posted-offer market sellers announce prices which remain fixed throughout the trading period.
potential monopoly price increase.
3 They achieved 100 percent of the potential increase under a postedoffer institution. 4 Smith and Williams (1989) replicated this experiment and found much lower prices; in the last periods of their sessions, monopolists achieved only about 6 percent of the potential price increase.
Smith and Smith and Williams explain these results by postulating that buyers' resistance to high prices (which they term "tacit collusion") is increased once the monopolist reveals himself prepared to sell at lower prices.
Further experiments have confirmed that firms can exercise market power more easily in a postedprice environment than in a double auction environment. After summarizing laboratory work in this area, Holt (1995, 398) concludes that "sellers are sometimes able to exercise market power in double auctions, but the influence of seller market power is much weaker (in the double auction) because of the incentives to offer last-minute price concessions and the more active role that buyers have in this institution." Since the monopolist cannot pre-commit to the monopoly price as trading progresses, it lowers its price when gains from trade still exist at the end of a trading period. As these price reductions become public knowledge, in succeeding periods more buyers wait for the price reductions, causing the monopolist's market power to be eroded further, as it may be more profitable for the monopolist to make some sales at competitive prices than no sales at all.
Although existing evidence demonstrates that double auctions are relatively successful at controlling market power, we argue that this evidence is too weak to presume that double auctions are sufficient to discount concerns about concentration in emissions markets. First, the claims for the double 4 auction are based on very few laboratory sessions (three for Smith, five for Smith and Williams).
Second, Smith's original experiments showed substantial output restriction under monopoly (on average his monopolists traded 2.28 units less than the competitive output, or 76 percent of the predicted output restriction of three units), so that efficiency may suffer in double auction markets even if prices are not raised. Third, these experiments did not test whether observed prices were converging to competitive levels nor did they provide a controlled contrast between competitive and monopoly environments.
It may be particularly difficult for double auctions to control market power in emission trading markets. These markets exhibit some special features not always found in the paradigmatic buyer/seller markets investigated by Smith. Smith's sellers are given marginal cost schedules; they earn no profits at all unless they trade. In contrast, sellers of emissions permits generally have the option of earning profits by using unsold permits in their own operations. Selling a permit may have a clearer opportunity cost and this may create a frame in which sellers may be less vulnerable to counter-withholding by buyers. Another special feature of many emissions markets is that agents can act as traders, buying and selling permits for resale or repurchase. This does not affect predicted prices under competition or single price monopoly, but it allows speculation and consequently may introduce more noise into the price structure and lead to unknown dynamic effects.
Several experiments have detected market power being exercised by dominant firms in double auction markets for tradable emission permits. Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994) adapted Smith's parameters to an emissions trading environment by allowing all agents to buy and sell coupons. In two of three sessions they discovered a "strong" monopolist who was able to achieve earnings close to those predicted for a single price monopolist. Even in the last period of the experiment the strong monopolists were able to achieve over 100 percent of the potential monopoly price increase (the weak monopolist 5 5 This summary is based on the graphical presentation of their MUDA sessions (their figures 6 and 7). 6 These data refer to simple manipulation. Brown-Kruse et al. also considered strategic manipulation, under which agents with market power had an incentive to alter their permit purchases to affect conditions in a downstream market. 7 Only two of the three sessions exhibited this outcome and then only in the last period of the monopoly treatments. Prices in the final periods of these sessions were lower but much more volatile than in previous periods. It is not clear whether this was a transitory phenomenon or an indication that these markets were beginning to converge to a competitive price outcome after a number of stable monopoly pricing outcomes. realized approximately 16% of the potential monopoly price increase). 5 Brown-Kruse, Elliott, and Godby (1995) also detected market power in laboratory markets related to emissions trading. In their experiment single buyers or single sellers of emission permits with a capacity to use ten permits participated in a market with ten sellers or ten buyers of one permit each. The value of a permit was derived from the cost savings it permitted the subject. The subject with market power had information about the cost schedules of the remaining participants but could not identify which trader owned which schedule. In the last period of their sessions, monopolists achieved an average of 40 percent of the potential price gain and monopsonists 166 percent of the potential price reduction. 6 Godby (1997, 1999, 2000) replicated many of the results from Brown-Kruse et al. in a market that allowed trading (i.e. buying and selling by the same agent). He aggregated the ten smaller agents in the Brown-Kruse et al. experiment into five composite subjects with the capacity to use two permits each, while retaining a single buyer or single seller with the capacity to use ten permits. All subjects were permitted to both buy and sell permits in the same period. In the last period of the experiment his monopsonists achieved an average of 147 percent of the available price reduction. His monopolists were not so successful. Despite a pattern of high prices in earlier periods, by the last period final transaction prices in the monopoly market were below competitive levels. In short, the limited laboratory evidence suggests that it is premature to be sanguine about the ability of double auctions to control market power in emissions trading markets. Further investigation is required before reaching a definite conclusion. In particular, it would be useful to directly contrast the performance of competitive and monopoly markets under the same set of underlying cost conditions. This paper presents such an experiment. We create a laboratory market in which ten traders are given redemption value schedules and allowed to trade permits. Five are expected to be net buyers of permits, five net sellers. We then aggregate either the five buyers into a single monopsonist or the five sellers into a single monopolist. Thus we consider market power both on the selling side (monopoly) and on the buying side (monopsony). Unlike all previous experimenters, who have adopted a between-sessions design for investigating this problem, we adopt an ABA crossover design obtain control over subject effects by allowing the same group to participate in both market power and competitive environments. Within any one session we switch between competition and a market power and back again. This allows a powerful contrast between the two market structures.
Experimental Design
We created a market environment in which ten subjects traded ration coupons in a computerized double auction. Subjects were informed that they each represented a firm which produced a product from several inputs.
8 Each period the firm received revenues from selling its product and incurred costs from purchasing inputs. One input, called leets, was rationed and could only be obtained by surrendering a ration coupon. No additional payment was required. Using leets increased profits by reducing other operating costs. Thus the marginal value of a ration coupon was equal to the increase in total operating profit induced by employing one more unit of leets. Coupons were distributed at the beginning of each period to some subjects but not to others. Subjects receiving coupons could use them to increase operating 9 We used the RNSC double auction reported in Godby, Mestelman, Muller and Welland (1997) and described in more detail in Mestelman and Muller (1998) .
profits or sell them to other subjects. Subjects who did not receive coupons could choose to buy them.
Once bought, these coupons could be used to increase operating profits or resold to other subjects. Thus all subjects were allowed both to buy and sell coupons, but no short sales were permitted. Coupons could not be carried over to future periods.
Clearly, the use of leets is analogous to the use of the environment to assimilate emissions and ration coupons are analogous to annual emission permits. We adopted the leets/coupons terminology in order to prevent the subjects' being influenced by emotional reactions to the concept of emissions trading and to be consistent with the terms used in the software.
Subjects traded coupons in a computerized double auction market.
9 They were guided in their trading by a wizard, a small window on their computer screens which informed them how much adding or subtracting one coupon from their holdings would change their operating profits. A market consisted of a number of trading periods. At the end of each trading period, subjects were informed of the redemption value of their coupon holdings, their net sales revenue and their operating profit for the period. Total earnings, including profits from trading, were continuously displayed in an inventory screen. Cumulative earnings for the market were displayed after the last period in each market.
Each experimental session contained four markets: one practice market lasting two or three periods of 10 minutes each and three regular markets lasting for 10 periods of three minutes each. During the unpaid practice market subjects were carefully instructed in the use of the software. Following this, subjects participated in the three "real" markets for that session. Subjects recorded their earnings at the end of each regular market. At the end of the session they were paid their earnings privately in cash.
The redemption values used in the experiment are derived from those used by Smith (1981) , Smith 8 10 A referee notes that trading commissions (as used by Smith) may create a greater incentive to undertake marginal trades than our equilibrium price tunnel does. If this is so, Smith's results will be biased towards obtaining competitive outputs.
and Williams (1989) and Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994) . The original parameters were expressed as supply and demand schedules. They induced a single competitive equilibrium price, an efficient trading quantity of eight, and a market power equilibrium quantity of five. We made four adjustments. First, we eliminated the need for commissions by raising the demand curve and lowering the supply curve to create an equilibrium price tunnel of five cents.
10 Secondly, we altered the supply curve to maintain the three unit separation of the competitive and market power predictions. Thirdly we expressed the sellers' marginal opportunity costs as redemption values. Finally, we introduced fixed costs and revenues computed so as to induce a profit of 100 cents per period for each player when coupons are efficiently allocated and the market price is at the mid-point of the equilibrium price tunnel (87 cents). These baseline parameters are reported in Table 1 and are reflected in the supply and demand schedules shown in Figure 1 .
We considered three market structures: competition, monopoly and monopsony. In the baseline (competitive) environment, each agent received two redemption values. The five agents who were expected to be net sellers each received two coupons per period. The remaining agents received no coupons. Note that the distinction between buyers and sellers depends entirely on equilibrium prices. In actual fact all participants were traders, who were permitted both to buy and sell and to speculate if they chose.
In the monopoly environment we combined the redemption values of the agents who had received coupon endowments into a single schedule, which was assigned to a single subject. The remaining four agents were shut out of the experiment. They remained at their terminals during the market power portion of the experiment, but they were not permitted to make trades. They were invited to observe the trading or to read a book. Their attention was drawn to the experiment, however, because they were required to respond to computer prompts at the beginning and end of each period. The locked-out traders received 9 11 The market power environments are consistent with a single firm in a five-firm industry acquiring the fixed costs of the remaining firms and assuming control over all industry output and price decisions in return for guaranteeing to the other firms payments equal to the competitive profits they have forgone.
fixed revenues sufficient to yield profits of 100 cents per period.
11 Similarly, the fixed costs of the monopolist were raised to yield an expected profit of 100 cents at the efficient allocation. The monopsony treatment was like the monopoly treatment, except that we combined the schedules of the subjects expected to be net buyers. The monopoly and monopsony parameters are reported in Table 1 and are reflected diagrammatically in Figure 1 .
As noted, each of the sessions consisted of a practice market and three "real" markets (denoted Markets 1, 2 and 3 in this paper). Markets 1 and 3 always had the same market structure, which contrasted with the structure used in Market 2. Monopoly and monopsony market structures were independently contrasted with competition in two ABA crossover designs (see Table 2 ). Different redemption values were used in each market. The redemption values in the practice market bore no relationship to the values in the real markets. The basic parameter sets of Table 1 were used in Market 1.
In Market 2 all redemption values were displaced downwards by subtracting 23 cents from each coupon value. In Market 3, all redemption values were displaced upwards by 26 cents from the baseline values.
Fixed revenues were adjusted to maintain a profit of 100 cents for each agent under an efficient allocation.
Benchmarks and Predictions
We computed trading volumes, prices, profits and gains from trade under four benchmark predictions (Table 3 ). The no-trade benchmark represents the result of the initial distribution of coupons.
Buyers earn 244 cents per period and sellers earn 305 cents, for a total of 549. Gains from trade are the increase in profits from these benchmarks. The competitive (or efficient) benchmark is the configuration which maximizes the total gains from trade. With this allocation, eight units are traded at a price between 85 and 89 cents and buyers and sellers both earn 500 cents per period, a gain of 256 cents for buyers and 12 We chose our market power subjects from a special subject pool because we wished to give market power the fullest chance of emerging. These subjects were informed that in some portions of the session they would have market power, but they were not instructed on how to use it nor were they informed of the specific market in which they would have market power. Smith (1981, 86) 
Results
We conducted eight sessions. The eight subjects who were to be given the role of monopolist or monopsonist were recruited from post-doctoral fellows and graduate students in Economics and Business. 12 or advanced undergraduate student as subjects and preselected monopolists who were thought "not likely to be easy on the buyers." Smith and Williams (1989, 36) followed a similar selection process, chosing monopolists based on "experience in several previous experiments and exhibiting a pattern of 'toughness' in pursuing their self-interest." Using an ex post classification, Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore found a significant difference between strong and weak monopolists in their emissions trading markets. 13 Because we wished to permit speculation, we did not prevent traders from making apparently unprofitable trades. Occasionally a trader will omit a digit or type an extra digit while entering data. These erroneous bids or asks, which would seriously distort arithmetic means, may be accepted before they can be corrected.
The remaining seventy-two subjects were recruited from the general student population through advertisements and classroom announcements. Sessions were planned to last for no more than 3 hours. Due to computer failures in a number of runs, the sessions lasted somewhat longer, up to 3½ hours. On these occasions, subjects gained additional trading experience in the aborted sessions. Due to the length of the sessions, three subjects had to be excused (one in one session and two in another) . These were replaced by available graduate students (one in Mathematics and one in Economics), who had participated in a pilot session the previous week. In one case a competitive market was terminated after 8 periods because of time constraints. After each session was over subjects completed a debriefing questionnaire and were paid privately in cash. The competitive subjects earned between $11.82 and $36.23 (mean $26.22) for their participation, plus a $5.00 show-up fee. The subjects with market power earned $39.13 to $66.91 (mean $48.16).
Average Prices
Due to the presence of some outlying observations, the average behaviour of prices in each period is better captured by median prices than by means.
13 Table 4 summarizes the means of these median prices, computed across all ten periods of each market and cross tabulated by market structure. For comparability with Market 1, prices in Markets 2 and 3 have been normalized by adding or subtracting the relevant shift parameter. Table 4 reveals a clear effect of market structure on average prices. The mean normalized price 12 14 We used the Huber/White sandwich error method (White 1980) as implemented by the Stata command xtreg (StataCorp 1997).
over all competitive sessions (85.61 cents) is within the competitive equilibrium band of 85 to 89 cents.
The mean monopoly price (98.89 cents) is much above the competitive band but distinctly below the benchmark monopoly price of 113 cents. The mean monopsony price (65.95 cents) is somewhat above the benchmark of 61 cents. Mean prices in the second market were somewhat above mean prices in Markets 1 and 3. Averaged across all three markets mean monopoly prices are 13.18 cents higher than mean competitive prices and mean monopsony prices are 19.66 cents lower.
These differences are overwhelmingly statistically significant. A simple two-way analysis of variance on treatment and market retains the null hypothesis of no market sequence effects (p = 0.2516) and strongly rejects the hypothesis of no treatment effects (p = 0.0000) This result might be challenged on two grounds: first because the panel nature of our data implies that the observations in any one session cannot be assumed to be independent and second that computing the mean across markets discards information in the period-by-period data. Table 5 reports a number of more sophisticated regression models which confirm the significant influence of market structure on median prices. In that table, Model 1 is the regression underlying the ANOVA model of Table 4 , estimated using a robust estimator to allow for autocorrelated or heteroscedastic disturbances.
14 Both market structure dummies are highly significant and the joint hypothesis of no structure effect is rejected at the 0.001 level. Model 2 reports the same regression model based on the mean of median prices for the last seven periods of each market. This formulation discards data from the first three periods on the grounds they are transitory adjustments to new parameter sets.
Compared to Model 1, the fit of Model 2 is distinctly improved. The market order dummies are individually and jointly insignificant. The estimated main effect of monopoly and monopsony are almost unchanged at 12.49 cents and -20.30 cents respectively.
While striking, the previous results do not exploit data from individual periods of each session.
13
15 Computed as 12.944, 12.944 -1.318, and 12.944 -2.916 for monopoly Markets 1, 2 and 3 respectively and in similar fashion for monopsony markets. Doing so could provide more precise estimates of the parameters. Model 4 is estimated on median prices by individual periods, again discarding the first three periods of each market (Models 3 and 5 will be discussed in the price discrimination section, below). The underlying data generating process for Models 3 to 5 is assumed to be , where is the price observation for session i, period t, is the corresponding vector of observations on the regressors , is a vector of coefficients, is a randomly distributed session specific effect and is a potentially autocorrelated error term, i.e. with the distributed identically and independently both of each other and of the subject specific term .
All estimates were made using a GEE technique (see Liang and Zeger 1986) and include a Huber/White sandwich error adjustment similar to that discussed in (White 1980) . This process uses the residuals from the initial regression to generate consistent standard errors even if the correlations within groups are not as hypothesized or if errors are heteroscedastic (see StataCorp 1997 for details).
The larger data set permits controls for interactions and random session effects. Once again the equation is estimated using robust techniques correcting for both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
The results are essentially the same as for the simpler model. Model 4 has the advantage of allowing the effect of market structure to vary across the three markets of each session. The point estimates of the market effect (the difference between the predicted competitive and predicted market power price) are +12.9, + 11.6, and +10.0 cents for monopoly in Markets 1, 2 and 3 respectively and -24.9 , -15.4, and -18.0 cents for monopsony. 15 The differences among these effects are not significant, although it is interesting that the point estimates show no marked decline in the market structure effects between Markets 2 and 3.
14 16 Detailed examination of the data reveals an anomaly. In exactly one of the 118 periods we recorded the appearance of phantom coupons. In that period alone the software appears to have permitted two subjects to sell more coupons than they owned, so that their net purchases were negative. We have excluded this period from the following tabulations. 17 In light of the robust results obtained from the analysis of variance in prices, we did not conduct more elaborate regression analyses of the quantity and efficiency data.
Coupon Sales and Efficiency
We define net purchases as the difference between the number of coupons bought and sold by the agents who are predicted to be buyers (Agents 1 to 5). Since there is no coupon banking, this is also the number of coupons that the buyers redeemed.
16 Table 6 reports net purchases cross-tabulated by treatment and market. There is some evidence that net purchases were restricted in our market power environments, however the extent of restriction is much less than the benchmark single-price monopoly or monopsony restrictions. Analysis of variance retains the null hypothesis that a three-way treatment classification has no effect on net purchases. If we combine the monopoly and monopsony categories, however, we can weakly reject the null of no effect of market power (F-test, p = 0.0709) while the null of no market sequence effect is maintained (F-test, p = 0.7118). Note that these are two-tailed tests.
17
The relatively small coupon sales restriction suggests that we will not find that efficiency is significantly affected by market power. This is confirmed in Figure 2 participants may attempt to earn trading profits by buying and reselling coupons (short sales were not permitted). This feature permits the number of transactions in a period to exceed the net purchases. Table 7 shows the mean number of transactions per period by treatment and market sequence. On average more than 11 coupons are traded each period in competitive markets, but only 7 net purchases are made (see Table 6 ). Nearly 38 percent of transactions are speculative. 18 Approximately 26 percent of the transactions in monopoly markets are speculative while fewer than 5 percent of monopsony market trades were speculative. This substantial difference between market structures is significant ( F-test, p = 0.0484).
The large number of trades which took place in the competitive markets may have contributed to the relatively low efficiency (91 percent) in these markets as compared to competitive markets in which participants act as either buyers or sellers (for a summary of double-auction results see Davis and Holt 1993, 136) . Speculative purchases in the markets with traders introduce sufficient noise that even the double auction is unable to discipline trading sufficiently to guarantee that all of the gains from trade are realized.
Profits
Although coupon sales were not greatly restricted by the exercise of market power, the distribution of profit certainly was. Table 8 reports profits by role, treatment and market. These profits include the fixed net revenues paid to inactive traders. The observed profits should be read in conjunction with the benchmarks of Table 3 . Consider the buyers. There is substantial variation among the observations. Nevertheless, in competitive markets they earned an average of 500 cents per period, exactly the benchmark profit. In monopoly markets their profits fell to 364, slightly above the benchmark of 344. In monopsony markets their profits rose to 601, somewhat below the benchmark of 604. Sellers' mean profits were 458 cents in competition (below the benchmark of 500), 602 under monopoly (barely above the benchmark of 601), and 350 under monopsony (slightly above the benchmark of 341). The treatment effect is statistically significant (one-way ANOVA, p = 0.0000, both for buyers and for sellers). We conclude that market structure has affected the distribution of profits in much the same manner as predicted by single price monopoly theory.
Price Discrimination
The fact that market power significantly affects prices and the distribution of profits but not efficiency suggests that agents with market power are able to practice systematic price discrimination.
Visual inspection of the price data confirms this impression. For example, Figure 3 displays the contract prices by period as they were generated in the first monopoly market of the first SCS session (left side of figure) and the first monopsony market of the first BCB session (right side of figure) . In the first market there is a single seller. Contracts are formed initially at prices above 113 cents and fall throughout each period, usually ending close to or in the competitive equilibrium price band. This pattern, which one would expect from a price-discriminating monopolist, does not decay across the 10 periods of the market.
A similar pattern is observed in the monopsony market (Figure 3 , right hand side). In all periods prices begin low and then rise. Initial prices are first formed at below the single-price monopoly line at 61 cents and then rise towards the competitive price. Note that opening contract prices do not converge into the competitive equilibrium price band and are below the benchmark monopsony price.
These patterns in the period-by-period data are confirmed by regression analysis. Model 3 of Table   5 reports a panel regression on the opening prices of each period estimated using robust panel methods.
(Once again, periods 1 -3 of each market were dropped). The point estimate for competitive opening prices in Market 1 is 84.47 cents, almost at the competitive level. There is a strong influence of market order. The point estimates for the effect of monopoly on opening prices are +41.12, +26.55, and +24.16 cents for 19 Computed as 41.118, respectively.
20 This regression was run with fixed effects rather than random effects because a Hausmann test rejected the hypothesis of independence between fixed effects and the remaining regressors. prices in all markets were very much closer to competitive levels. Model 5 of Table 5 reports a period-byperiod regression on closing prices. 21 This suggests that closing prices in all market structures were essentially competitive. Note that the constant term (87.24) is within the competitive band and that we retain the nulls of no market structure effects and no interaction effects. This pattern of market power in opening and median prices coupled with competitive closing prices is consistent with successful price discrimination.
Price Convergence Patterns
Our results suggest that the monopoly and monopsony subjects were able to manipulate prices to their advantage while participating in a double-auction market. Examination of the period-by-period median prices (see Figure 4) suggests that this effect does not disappear over the lifetime of each market. In an attempt to confirm this impression, we estimate the asymptotic median price for each market and test for treatment and market effects using a procedure similar to that of Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995) . We also estimate the asymptotic closing price for each market in order to evaluate the conjecture attributed to Porter (1991) that price discrimination may arise in double-auction markets with market power.
We estimated the model where is market number within session, is period number within market and is either median price or closing price for the period. D i is a dummy for market i. Interdependence of the observations was controlled by using the Newey-West (1987) procedure to estimate the covariance matrix when heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation were indicated in the results of the original specification. Results of these regressions by session and market are presented in Tables 9 and 10 . The mean asymptotic median and closing normalized prices by treatment and market (based on the estimated coefficients of in Tables 9 and 10 ) are presented in Table 11 .
The results indicate that prices in monopoly and monopsony markets are not converging to competitive levels. Median prices in competitive markets converge on average to 87.8, within the competitive equilibrium band. Median prices in monopoly markets converge on average to 99.4, well above the competitive range. Median prices in monopsony markets converge on average to 68.2, well below the competitive range. The effect of treatment is strongly significant (p = 0.0000), while neither market sequence nor its interaction with treatment is significant (p = 0.2057 and p = 0.3704 respectively). The asymptotic median prices are broadly in line with the observed median prices (Table 4) , thus showing that there is no tendency for median prices to converge to competitive levels as experience is gained. Averaged over all markets, asymptotic closing prices for competition lie within the equilibrium band. Similarly, asymptotic closing prices lie slightly below the competitive equilibrium band in the case of monopoly and substantially below the competitive equilibrium band in the case of monopsony. The main effect of treatment is significant (p = 0.0438) and the main effect of market sequence is weakly significant (p = 0.0823). There are no interaction effects. However, the sustained spread between median and closing 19 prices suggests that agents with market power were systematically able to practice price discrimination.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our results clearly establish that our monopoly and monopsony subjects were able to manipulate prices to their advantage despite any limitations placed on them by the double-auction institution. This is not a transient effect which is eliminated with experience. We confirmed this by estimating the asymptotic median price for each market and testing for treatment and market effects.
The insignificant effect of market structure on efficiency and the relatively small constraint on net purchases, together with the observed price patterns, strongly suggests that efficiency losses were mitigated by price discrimination. As a result, subjects with market power were able to increase their share of the profits substantially (relative to the competitive environments) without greatly harming efficiency. The sustained spread between median and closing prices in the convergence analysis suggests that subjects with market power were systematically able to practice price discrimination.
Our results exhibit a stronger effect of market power in double auctions than was observed in most previous work. Table 12 compares the price results across our experiment and five predecessors. To allow for the possibility of convergence to competitive equilibrium in a session we examine only the mean prices in the last periods reported (we shift from median prices here because the data from other experiments are described this way). In the present experiment, monopolists achieved 55 percent of the potential price increase while our monopsonists achieved 65 percent of the potential price declines. The monopolists were more successful than those of previous experiments while the monopsonists were somewhat less successful in comparison.
One might ask if the success of subjects with market power is due to a lack of experience in the double-auction market. Because previous experiments ran only one market per session they provide little evidence on this score. In our sessions, however, participants in Market 3 had experience in both a competitive and a market power environment in the immediately preceding markets. Although we have only 20 two observations per cell in this case, the results suggest that monopsony resists pressures for price erosion more than monopoly. The monopolists in this situation achieved, on average, only 29.5 percent of the benchmark price deviation in the last period while the monopsonists achieved, on average, 64.5 percent.
Careful investigation of the effect of experience in these markets would be valuable.
One could also ask how price discrimination could persist in a double auction when all prices are public information. This challenges the "tacit collusion" hypothesis Smith (1981) suggests as a reason why monopoly pricing may be difficult to maintain in double auctions. One possible answer to this question may lie in the nature of our markets. Unlike Smith's experiments, our markets included the presence of speculative activity, combined with the changing market "fundamentals" associated with within session treatment changes. This could have created an environment in which price discrimination could persist due to the difficulty subjects might have in interpreting the implications of price observations. Since naturallyoccurring double-auction markets are also characterised by speculative activity and changing market conditions, our results may indicate that market power pricing and price discrimination outcomes may be more likely than previous experimental results have suggested.
Our results extend and confirm the findings of Brown Kruse, Elliot and Godby (1995 ), Godby (1997 , 1999 , 2000 , and Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994) , all of which provide evidence that double auctions provide an ineffective constraint on market power. Our study is unique in employing a withinsubjects design which allows us to control for subject effects more precisely than is possible in a betweensubjects design. The ability to alternate between market structures within the same session provides a rigorous test of the causal link between market structure and performance.
Our work has somewhat conflicting implications for emissions trading policy. On the one hand, it suggests that double-auction markets for emissions permits can be quite efficient even when the buying or selling side is highly concentrated. On the other hand it suggests that agents with market power may be able to use it to capture substantially increased share of the gains from emissions trading. If not all countries delegate their assigned amount to domestic entities, market concentration may be high enough to cause a significant redistribution of the surplus from Greenhouse Gas markets. The problem may be even greater in affecting the political feasibility of regional emissions trading markets in which there is likely to be a single buyer. Note: Profit in efficient allocation includes both net trading revenue and the value of coupons redeemed. Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the Newey-West (1987) procedure is used to estimate the covariance matrix when heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation were indicated in the results of the original specification. Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the Newey-West (1987) procedure is used to estimate the covariance matrix when heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation were indicated in the results of the original specification.. 
